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REFLECTIONS ON A METHODOLOGY 
FOR CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS 
James A. Keller 
In a recent article in FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY, Alvin Plantinga advised Christian 
philosophers to philosophize in light of their fundamental beliefs as Christians. Believing 
that his discussion does not give proper weight to the necessary role of secular beliefs in 
modifying our Christian beliefs, in this article I propose that Christian beliefs and secular 
beliefs should be related more dialectically than Plantinga suggests--i.e., that neither 
should always be given precedence. I defend this proposal with several examples on a 
variety of topics from the history of Christian thought and suggest how much weight to 
give to beliefs of each type. 
One of our perennial problems as Christians is how our Christian beliefs and 
commitments relate to the rest of our beliefs and commitments. That we are 
Christian philosophers helps to specify the problem for us, for it indicates a 
tradition of issues and (conflicting) beliefs and commitments to which we belong. 
But it also intensifies the problem, for philosophers are supposed to include 
among their special concerns this sort of question about how various beliefs and 
commitments relate to each other. Thus, in addition to the general responsibility 
which we share with all Christians to be concerned about this problem, we have 
some professional responsibility to be concerned about it-and that not just for 
our own sakes, but also for the sake of the entire Christian community. (Of 
course, even among Christian philosophers it makes sense to allow for differences 
of focus. I would not want even to seem to suggest that every Christian philosopher 
must devote his professional energies to worrying about this problem. But I do 
think that we Christian philosophers as a group have a particular responsibility 
to think about it.) 
Therefore, I noted with considerable pleasure Prof. Alvin Plantinga's recent 
discussion of this problem in Faith and Philosophy. I Plantinga advises that 
Christian philosophers should display more autonomy and "integrity-integrity 
in the sense of integral wholeness" (254). He articulates two main ways in which 
Christian philosophers should show this autonomy and integrity: (1) they should 
select the topics for their own research programs not merely from those current 
in the broader philosophical community, but also from the philosophical topics 
at which the Christian community must work, regardless of whether these are of 
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interest to that broader community; and (2) they should do their philosophizing 
in light of the fundamental beliefs which they have as members of the Christian 
community, not in light of the fundamental beliefs of those philosophers who 
happen to be the current "bright lights" of philosophy. Plantinga claims that the 
Christian philosopher is fully within his intellectual rights in philosophizing in 
these ways rather than in whatever ways happen to be popular currently. He 
illustrates his advice and claims with several examples, some of which I shall 
comment on later in my paper. 
Plantinga's advice to Christian philosophers has an admirable boldness. It 
seems to recall us to our roots in our faith. And yet attractive as this advice 
might seem, I am unable to follow it in one important regard. I have little trouble 
with his suggestion regarding choosing research topics, particularly since he does 
not suggest that one must choose either the currently fashionable topics or the 
ones of interest only to the Christian community, as though this were an exclusive 
or exhaustive disjunction. But I do not think it is wise for us Christians to follow 
his other principle, at least as he develops it in his examples. What I find lacking 
in his principle and his examples is a discussion of the role that beliefs of our 
contemporary intellectual community (which I shall term "secular beliefs"2) can 
and should play in modifying our Christian beliefs. 3 But I would not want simply 
to reverse his principle; at least sometimes the Christian philosopher should, as 
Plantinga claims, use her Christian beliefs to illuminate and attempt to solve 
problems in the broader philosophical community. (He gives as an example the 
idea of God as a collector of elements into sets as a way of solving certain 
problems in set theory [270].) Rather I propose that one's Christian beliefs and 
these secular beliefs should be related in a far more dialectical fashion than 
Plantinga seems to suggest. In this paper I want to articulate and defend this 
proposal. 
Christian and Secular Beliefs as Dialectically Related 
By saying that one's Christian beliefs and secular beliefs should be dialectically 
related, I mean that neither one should automatically always be given precedence. 
Sometimes Christian beliefs should be given precedence, but sometimes secular 
beliefs should be, even when these have the consequence of implying the falsity 
of some Christian beliefs. Later I will say something about how one should 
determine which should be given precedence. But now I want to try to give 
some plausibility to my proposal by describing some situations in which it seems 
appropriate to give precedence to secular beliefs and explaining why it seems so. 
The obvious problem with ever giving precedence to secular beliefs over one's 
Christian beliefs is that it seems to involve a denial of one's faith or disloyalty 
to God. But I think that this appearance is deceiving. Indeed, I want to reverse 
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the charge: clinging to one's Christian beliefs can sometimes compromise or 
inhibit one's loyalty and service to God. For one's Christian beliefs are generally 
the beliefs of that part of the Christian community with which one is currently 
affiliated. And always to give precedence to any of this group's beliefs over all 
of those of one's current culture would forever block any hope of gaining from 
that culture any critical insight into one's beliefs that might lead one to a more 
correct understanding of Christianity and of God's will. This is crucial to my 
whole case, so let me reemphasize it: one has no legitimate grounds for assuming 
that one's current understanding of the Christian faith as reflected in one's 
Christian beliefs is correct in every regard-indeed given the very considerable 
differences among Christians and the inadequacies we all have, one has good 
reason to suspect it may not be fully correct-nor does one have any reason to 
think that Christian beliefs alone can supply sufficient resources for correcting 
whatever inadequacies there may be. (Perhaps Plantinga would agree with me 
on this point, but I do not find in his advice a recognition and appropriation of 
it.) This is not merely a theoretical point with little relevance to Christian beliefs, 
but a general truth which has many important illustrations in the history of 
Christian thought. In using these illustrations from other times I am presupposing 
that my suggestions on a methodology for Christian philosophers (and Plantinga's 
advice) apply to Christian philosophers not just today but throughout the history 
of Christianity. 
Examples from Biblical Interpretation 
I will begin with some relatively uncontroversial examples even if they are 
not central to the current concerns of Christian philosophers. Consider how 
modern scientific discoveries forced a reinterpretation of certain biblical texts. 
For example, in Galileo's time the heliocentric theory of the universe was opposed 
on the basis of several biblical texts, among them Joshua 10: 12-13, in which 
Joshua commands the sun to stand still (not the earth to stop rotating).' When 
the heliocentric theory had become widely accepted, the Christian community 
decided that Joshua was just speaking popularly, so there was not really any 
conflict between Christian and secular beliefs on this matter. But little was 
learned from this episode. For when modern geology proposed that the earth 
was far more than a few thousand years old, many intellectual members of the 
Christian community opposed the theory as contradicting the Genesis narrative 
and thus challenging the authority of the Bible. Today I suspect that most 
Christian philosophers accept the view that the earth is billions of years old and 
that the Bible should not be interpreted as teaching otherwise. But I doubt that 
this view would have become widespread among us Christian philosophers 
without the pressure provided by modern science. 
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Nor is it plausible to suggest that Christianity had within itself resources to 
evoke these reinterpretations of the biblical texts. To be sure, certain earlier 
thinkers, including even Augustine, had proposed an allegorical interpretation 
of various biblical materials, including the Genesis material. But these proposals 
had not altered the general tendency to interpret the term "day" in Genesis 1 as 
a period of twenty-four hours. Moreover, this allegorizing was done in accordance 
with a general theory of literary interpretation also not derived from Christian 
beliefs. 
It might be thought that these first two examples concern matters peripheral 
to the Christian faith. But the general topic of the interpretation of the Bible is 
surely not peripheral. 5 So let us ask whether there is a Christian theory of how 
to interpret the Bible. Is it an explicit part of our Christian beliefs or can it be 
derived from them alone'? I hardly think SO.6 Rather we must rely on secular 
theories of historical and literary criticism to guide us in our attempt to understand 
the Bible. The Protestant Reformation was supported in part by what were then 
new techniques of historical and literary criticism, developed in the Renaissance 
and later accepted by Roman Catholicism as well. And the last 100 or so years 
of biblical scholarship, employing more recently developed techniques of literary 
and historical analysis of the biblical texts, have greatly revised our understanding 
of the Bible and of the history oflsrael and thefirst-century Christian community. 7 
These were new techniques, advanced by the "bright lights" of the disciplines. 
To be sure, these more modem techniques and their conclusions are not beyond 
question or criticism. Even scholars who employ these techniques do not always 
agree on the details of their conclusions. But the significance of this fact should 
not be overestimated. Secular historians using similar techniques on issues in 
secular history also do not always agree on all the details, yet they do not 
therefore question the techniques in general (though any particular technique 
might be questioned). 
A more radical challenge to the use of modem techniques of historical and 
literary analysis of the biblical materials is offered by very conservative Christians 
who do not accept the techniques because they find the results unacceptable. 8 
(Of course, these Christians are also employing techniques for interpreting the 
Bible, techniques which are no more derived solely from Christian beliefs than 
are the techniques which they reject.) But if they reject any technique which 
yields results in conflict with their current Christian beliefs, they will be forever 
locked into their current understanding of the Bible and the Christian beliefs 
which they derive from it. But suppose they are wrong. How would they ever 
find out'? Although I do not want to suggest that Plantinga would endorse the 
views on the Bible held by these very conservative Christians, it does seem to 
me that they are operating in accordance with his advice. Their approach 
exemplifies the problem I find with Plantinga's advice. 9 
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Plantinga does acknowledge that Christian philosophers might have to modify 
their beliefs "if there were genuine and substantial arguments against them from 
premises that have some legitimate claim on the Christian philosopher" (268). 
But he does not suggest what these premises might be or what the criteria are 
for a legitimate claim on a Christian philosopher. Do the premises include only 
Christian doctrinal beliefs? Or do they include certain other beliefs as well? If 
the latter, what are the criteria for them? If they include well substantiated secular 
beliefs, then there may be less difference between his advice and my proposal 
than I had thought. But even if they do, we still need a discussion of how they 
should be identified and how they relate to Christian beliefs. 
Problems of Identifying Essential Christian Beliefs 
We have looked at problems arising in connection with methods of biblical 
interpretation. Similar difficulties arise when claims are made to the effect that 
certain beliefs, understood in certain ways or within a certain range of ways, 
are essential Christian beliefs or are the correct way to understand the Christian 
faith. How would such claims be defended? Probably a large part of the defense 
would rest on claims about the past, perhaps claims that these have been part 
of the confessions of most churches or have been taught by certain church 
authorities or theologians or are taught in the Bible. But how would these claims 
be defended? Presumably by historical investigation. But what techniques would 
this investigation employ? Is it legitimate to require that the techniques produce 
a certain result for them to be acceptable? If so, how would one ever discover 
that one was wrong? And if not, what shall we conclude if we discover that 
there has been a great variety of understandings of many basic creedal elements 
among Christians? Should we say that anything within this range is legitimate? 
Or should we be more restrictive? If so, on what basis? Conversely, why should 
we limit the permissible range of variance to the range already achieved? On 
what grounds can we say so much variance is all right, but no more? Perhaps 
it is a matter of historical accident that some permissible (or even preferable) 
variation has not yet been formulated. 
These questions underscore the obvious: we cannot justify a claim about what 
we should take to be Christian beliefs simply by listing what past Christians 
have taken them to be. To complete the argument we need another sort of 
premise, something like "We should take Christian beliefs to be the same as 
past Christians-more precisely, certain past Christians-have." But this premise 
is far from evident. How could it be justified? Even worse, it seems that no 
matter how we identify these beliefs, many Christians will disagree, for not all 
Christians take the same beliefs to be Christian. One might reply, "Well, it is 
enough if we understand the essentials in the same way." But we have seen the 
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difficulties in determining what the essential beliefs are and what is the correct 
way to understand them. 10 
The difficulty in answering this question about how we should determine what 
are essential Christian beliefs suggests that we may not be able to make this 
determination with any certainty or precision. Our inability to do this has impor-
tant consequences because one person's acceptable modification may be another 
person's apostasy. The views of the very conservative Christians discussed earlier 
illustrate this. But they are by no means the only examples. Paul Tillich was 
praised by some for his creative reinterpretation of the Christian faith and con-
demned by others for abandoning that faith. Similar controversy greeted the 
proposals regarding the understanding of the incarnation in The Myth of God 
Incarnate. II In these and many other instances, what some Christians saw as an 
abandoning of the Christian faith, other Christians saw as mere reinterpretations 
of Christian beliefs supported by research or argument. But if we cannot agree 
on what are the essential doctrines of Christianity or on what are the permissible 
limits on ways to interpret them, then we cannot expect agreement on when a 
doctrine is simply being reinterpreted and when it is being abandoned. Yet I do 
not believe that we should respond to this uncertainty simply by clinging to our 
current beliefs, for that is no guarantee of faithfulness to God. And surely our 
primary calling as Christian philosophers is to faithful obedience to God as 
revealed in Christ, not to loyalty to our ecclesial tradition or to our current 
understanding of Christianity. 
The Propriety of Using Philosophical Beliefs and Techniques 
I have spent considerable time defending the propriety and necessity of using 
some secular techniques and beliefs regarding historical and literary analysis. I 
discussed these rather than philosophical theories and techniques for two reasons. 
First, any defense of a certain belief as Christian typically will involve claims 
for whose assessment these disciplines are relevant. Second, as I argued, it is 
not legitimate to reject such techniques and beliefs solely because they yield 
results inconsistent with the Christian faith as one understands it; however, there 
is no reason not to extend this principle to philosophical beliefs and techniques 
(though this extension would not commit one to accepting every philosophical 
belief or technique being discussed, any more than scholars in other disciplines 
would have to accept everything being discussed in their disciplines). Thus, it 
is appropriate to use certain philosophical beliefs and techniques to interpret and 
criticize one's Christian beliefs. Always to reject any philosophical techniques 
or beliefs solely because they yield conclusions inconsistent with one's current 
Christian beliefs would be to make too strong an assumption of the correctness 
of one's current understanding of Christianity; if one does not make that assump-
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tion, then such inconsistencies would provide an occasion for investigating the 
correctness of some of one's Christian beliefs, an investigation which would 
require using secular as well as other Christian beliefs. But though I make this 
case for the appropriateness of using certain philosophical beliefs and principles, 
I would also emphasize something about philosophical theories: no philosopher 
has established his general approach to the general satisfaction of the philosophical 
community, and few even try. Therefore, there is no basis for making it incumbent 
on the Christian philosopher to do so or even to try to do so before he is 
intellectually permitted to employ his general Christian framework in his 
philosophizing. Moreover, he is not obligated to accept as true any controversial 
philosophical theory being discussed in his day, even if it is advanced by one 
of the "bright lights." 
The history of Christianity contains many crucial disputes for which philosoph-
ical beliefs and techniques were relevant. For example, shortly after the beginning 
of the Protestant Reformation some leaders of the Lutheran and of the Reformed 
movements met at Marburg in an attempt to define a common understanding of 
the faith which could serve as a basis for uniting the two movements. They were 
able to reach agreement on all but one point: the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. 
On that point, it seems to me that Luther exemplified starting with what he 
believed as a Christian. Quoting the words of institution, "This is my body," he 
insisted that Christ is physically as well as spiritually present in the elements. 
In opposition, the Reformed thinkers drew on two arguments: (I) a passage in 
John 6 shows the propriety of interpreting statements metaphorically, and (2) 
since Jesus now sits at the right hand of God, his body is physically present 
elsewhere and cannot be physically present in the elements. This argument clearly 
rests on the philosophical conviction that a physical body cannot be in two places 
at the same time. Luther had no reply to the philosophical point; he could not 
explain how Jesus' body could be physically present in two or more places at 
once. 12 A full response to the philosophical point certainly would have required 
development of an explanation of how Jesus' body could be in more than one 
place at a time (not only on the right hand of the Father, but also everywhere 
the Lord's Supper is being celebrated simultaneously). Should Luther have tried 
to develop such an explanation? If he could not, should he have considered 
reinterpreting his belief? It should be noted that he would have seen this as no 
less than an abandoning of his faith. 
It is not my purpose here to argue for either the Reformed or the Lutheran 
view. I want only to point out that if the Reformed thinkers were right, there 
would seem to be no way that Luther could have discovered his error. However, 
if he had followed my proposal, either side might have been able to establish 
its point. Since "is" can mean identity as well as bear the metaphorical (or 
"spiritual") meaning urged by Reformed thinkers, each side could have argued 
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for its view of the proper interpretation of Jesus' words, drawing on whatever 
secular or Christian beliefs seemed relevant. But to proceed in this way is to 
assume the legitimacy of allowing secular beliefs to reinterpret (and thus to 
correct) one's Christian beliefs. 
My last major illustration in support of my proposal about the dialectical 
relation of one's Christian beliefs and secular beliefs is the use of broad-ranging 
philosophical schemes to interpret one's Christian beliefs. Here the greatest and 
clearest example, but celtainly not the only one, is Thomas Aquinas. As is well 
known, Aquinas embarked on a bold venture: he used the philosophy of the new 
"bright light" in the philosophical firmament to interpret the Christian faith. Of 
course, he did so in the full confidence that he would not have to abandon any 
of the truths of Christianity. And he did not simply accept Aristotle's system 
without reservation or criticism; to name only one important difference, he used 
the concept of existence (esse) in a quite new way. Nevertheless, his attempt 
was greeted with considerable reservations by his contemporaries, and his writings 
were for a brief time banned by the bishop of Paris. I cannot help wondering 
whether he would even have attempted his bold undertaking if he had heard and 
followed Plantinga's advice. 
However, Aquinas was emboldened by another belief, the belief that all truth 
is God's truth. This belief gave him courage in his bold venture, for he was sure 
that true philosophy could not contradict the truths of the Christian faith. This 
belief has been widely held throughout the history of Christian thought; probably 
many, perhaps all, Christian philosophers would accept it. But there are a couple 
of rubs in applying it. One rub concerns identifying the true philosophy. The 
other concerns identifying the correct understanding of the Christian faith. 
Because I do not believe that we can assume that we have got either of them 
right, I do not want to give absolute precedence to beliefs of either type. 
Determining the Burden of Proof 
But though I do not want to give absolute precedence to beliefs of either type, 
I regard it as legitimate to place the burden of proof differently on different sorts 
of issues. A Christian philosopher need not accept various broad-ranging 
metaphysical schemes which have no place for anything like a Christian God 
(like naturalism) unless the grounds for such a scheme are far more overwhelming 
than the grounds for any scheme with which I am familiar in the history of 
philosophy. Nor is the Christian under any obligation to justify on naturalistic 
grounds his belief in God for that belief to be intellectually respectable-here I 
agree with Plantinga. 11 On the other hand, it seems to me highly dubious for a 
Christian philosopher to determine the acceptability of far more local theories 
(such as compatibilism and event causation) simply (or even primarily) on the 
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grounds of their implications for Christian beliefs. Somewhere in-between would 
come far-ranging metaphysical schemes which have a divine figure, but one 
whose characteristics do not agree completely with those of one's tradition-for 
example, such process philosophies as Whitehead's and Hartshorne's. It clearly 
is question-begging to reject them simply because they do not offer the same 
understanding of God as certain traditional views. Not only is there not unanimity 
on the characteristics of God within the Christian tradition (consider, e.g., the 
differences between Plantinga's and Aquinas' beliefs about God, or between 
Plantinga's and Pseudo-Dionysius'), but the characteristics various Christian 
thinkers ascribed to God were themselves the result of the interactions of these 
Christians with various metaphysical schemes (Platonism of various sorts and 
Aristotelianism, to name only two), and one may well question whether these 
are the best schemes in terms of which to understand the characteristics of God. 
Indeed, the Christian faith that any of us holds today employs many philosophical 
notions for its understanding and expression. Thus, the line between Christian 
beliefs and secular beliefs is a vague and ever-changing one. \4 
The three-fold delineation offered in the previous paragraph might be defended 
in terms of some common epistemological principles. For example, a person 
should require more evidence before he abandons a more central belief than he 
would require to abandon a less central belief. If belief in the existence of God 
occupies a central position in the thought of a Christian philosopher, he should 
hold fast to it in the absence of truly overwhelming evidence for some view 
inconsistent with it. But some beliefs about God (or other Christian belief5) 
might be changed without abandoning one's faith and with at most minor changes 
in one's central beliefs; thus, schemes with a divine figure who does not have 
all the same characteristics as one already believes God to have do not require 
such an overwhelming case. Nor do secular beliefs which impact more peripher-
ally on one's Christian beliefs. This three-fold delineation is admittedly rough, 
but I do not see any clear way at present to make it more precise. Indeed, my 
proposal may preclude more precision. For I am insisting that we should not put 
unquestioned reliance on either Christian or secular beliefs and that we must 
therefore determine in each case how much weight we should give to each. But 
though I may not be able to give any more precision to my proposal in the 
abstract, I might be able to indicate further where it agrees and where it differs 
from Plantinga's advice by commenting briefly on some of the examples he 
discusses. 
I agree with him that the Christian philosopher is not required to meet the 
criteria of verificationism (256-58), but this accords with my proposal as well 
as his because verification ism is a global theory. Although it was presented as 
a thesis about meaning, its proponents advanced it in order to validate important 
conclusions on issues that pertain to world-views. (Moreover, verificationism 
REFLECTIONS ON METHODOLOGY 153 
has so many problems other than its conflicts with Christian beliefs that there 
is little wonder that a Christian philosopher might not think her Christian beliefs 
were seriously challenged by it. But would she think her Christian beliefs were 
more seriously challenged if the only problems with verificationism were its 
conflicts with Christian beliefs?) 
Plantinga also discusses the probabilistic argument against the existence of 
God based on the existence of a certain (presumably large) quantity of evil in 
the world (259-64). He points out that even if we grant for the sake of argument 
that so large a quantity of evil renders the existence of God improbable, it would 
not be irrational to continue to believe in the existence of God if we have other, 
adequate grounds for believing that God exists. And he claims that the Christian 
philosopher is perfectly within his rights to take the existence of God as one of 
his basic beliefs and that he does not have to try to justify this belief on grounds 
acceptable to his non-theistic colleagues. I am not concerned here to dispute 
this. However, I am concerned to ask whether the existence of so much evil of 
such-and-such types might suggest the appropriateness of questioning not the 
existence of God, but our understanding of the characteristics of God and the 
nature of his relation to the created order. After all, even if thinkers like Calvin 
are correct in claiming that we have a divinely-implanted disposition to believe 
in God, how detailed and precise an understanding of God does this disposition 
include? And even if it is in principle detailed and precise, should one not, given 
the differences among Christians, ask which Christian's detailed and precise 
understanding of God is the correct one? If one does not assume that her current 
understanding of God is beyond correction, must she restrict herself to Christian 
sources for correctives, or may she also use secular sources? Indeed, must she 
not also use secular sources? 
In a third example Plantinga discusses personhood, determinism and free will, 
and agent causation. Taking God as his model for a person, he argues for 
libertarianism, since God is a free person in a sense which precludes both 
determinism and compatibilism; then he argues that because God is an agent 
cause, the Christian has reason to reject claims that event causation is the only 
kind of causation (264-68). My problems with this account center on what he 
takes it that we already "rationally believe" as Christians and how he interprets 
and applies these beliefs. Even if we do rationally believe that God is a person, 
do we understand the personhood of God well enough to use that understanding 
to illuminate what is involved in being a human person? The whole Thomistic 
tradition, to name only one important Christian tradition, would reject this 
approach as impossible. To whatever extent we understand what we say about 
God, we do so by analogy with what we say about creatures; we cannot reverse 
that process. Of course, Plantinga is not a Thomist, but his differences with the 
Thomists are differences with other Christians. Can he appeal to his beliefs as 
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a Christian as rational grounds for rejecting their beliefs as Christians? If not, 
to what will he appeal? 
Later on in his discussion of agent causation, Plantinga claims that the Christian 
"already and independently believes that acts of volition have causal efficacy; 
he believes, indeed, that the physical universe owes its very existence to just 
such volitional acts-God's undertaking to create it" (267). I hold no brief for 
event causation, but I am surprised by Plantinga's claim. How did volitions 
become an element in Christian beliefs? This concept of volition as an explicit 
concept in Western thought is of fairly recent origin, and it would surely take 
considerable argument to show that it is implicit in certain Christian beliefs. 
Moreover, even if we overlook the reference to volitions, it seems to me that 
the discussion of agent causation requires supplementation. To be sure, Christian 
narratives and confessions speak of God as doing certain things. But this is 
non-technical language. In their everyday conversation even advocates of event 
causation use this non-technical language to speak of people doing things. The 
question is whether such speech can be interpreted adequately---or perhaps even 
preferably-in terms of event causation. 
Plantinga suggests that Christian speech about God doing things can not be 
interpreted in terms of event causation, for God is not subject to the causal laws 
of the universe which he himself established by creating the universe. Let us 
grant this. But might there not be analogous laws of the divine nature-laws 
which are not foreign impositions or limits on God, but laws which are partly 
constitutive of the divine nature? This suggestion is not as clear as I would like 
it to be, but I do not think that I have a sufficiently clear understanding of the 
divine nature to use my understanding of it to rule out theories of how human 
agents function. Plantinga's discussion seems to imply that he does. If he would 
claim this, can he rationally make that claim without providing a justification 
for it? Surely a simple appeal to what Christians---or even Christian philoso-
phers-believe will not be adequate, for they do not agree on this matter. The 
appeal must be at least to beliefs which are truly Christian,15 and if one makes 
this appeal one must specify how these beliefs are to be identified. I claim that 
in making this identification, it is proper and indeed necessary to use secular 
beliefs and techniques; I understand Plantinga to be denying this (or at least 
strongly de-emphasizing it). And there I see the difference between us. 
This difference has significant implications for how one should view secular 
beliefs and should relate those beliefs to one's Christian beliefs. On my proposal, 
one's Christian beliefs enjoy no privileged status simply because they are (sup-
posedly) Christian; of course, anyone of them may have a very secure status 
because of the strength of its grounds or because of its centrality in our set of 
beliefs, but in this regard they are not in principle different from various secular 
beliefs which might enjoy a similar status. If there are inconsistencies, conflicts, 
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or tensions between one's secular beliefs and one's Christian beliefs, one should 
approach these problems as one would approach problems between one's secular 
beliefs. My proposal admittedly incurs the danger of distorting or even losing 
one's faith through a too-easy acceptance of secular beliefs. But Plantinga's 
advice runs the opposite danger of distorting it by clinging to inadequate formu-
lations because one misses the critical perspective on it offered by secular beliefs. 
There are dangers either way; neither way guarantees that we shall be faithful 
to God. But I have tried to suggest reasons why my proposal for a greater 
openness to secular beliefs is preferable to Plantinga's advice. 16 
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philosophical thought (e.g., homoousios, agenetos, esse, being-itself) to express Christian beliefs? 
If this is done, is the belief still Christian, and does the concept then become a Christian concept 
(whatever that would be)? Moreover, if it is done, what checks, if any, should there be on the 
process? But though these and other questions about the distinction between Christian and secular 
beliefs deserve attention, I shall not focus on them in this paper. Rather, I shall simply assume that 
the distinction can somehow be made. (Note that Plantinga must also make this assumption or there 
would be no point to his paper.) 
3. In fairness to Plantinga, I want to point out that he is not saying that the Christian philosopher 
has nothing to learn from his non-Christian colleagues nor saying that the Christian philosopher 
should isolate himself and refuse to enter into discussion with his non-Christian colleagues. Indeed, 
he explicitly denies both these ideas. Moreover, he adds that "while Christian philosophers need not 
and ought not to see themselves as involved, for example, in a common effort to determine whether 
there is such a person as God, we are all, theist and non-theist alike, engaged in the common human 
project of understanding ourselves and the world in which we find ourselves" (270). But none of 
this, he insists, "runs counter to" the things he said elsewhere in his paper, some of which I 
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summarized in the text. However, I do not understand how these statements about the usefulness 
of secular beliefs relate to his other points. Moreover, even in these statements I find missing an 
affirmation of the usefulness, indeed of the indispensability, of certain non-Christian beliefs and 
techniques for modifying our Christian beliefs. I shall be emphasizing this in my paper; therefore, 
I shall be focusing on the differences rather than the similarities between Plantinga's advice and my 
proposal. 
4. This and other texts are mentioned by Jerome J. Langford in Cali/eo, Science and the Church 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), pp. 52-53. Scriptural passages were of course 
not the only grounds on which certain thinkers rejected the heliocentric theory, not even the only 
grounds advanced by Christians. But they were among the grounds. Will Durant points out that 
"many theologians felt that the Copernican astronomy was so clearly incompatible with the Bible 
that if it prevailed the Bible would lose authority and Christianity itself would suffer" (The Story of 
Civilization, Vol. VII: The Age o(Reason Begins [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961], p. 606). 
5. The interpretation of the Bible is not a professional concern for philosophers, but my reason for 
discussing it will become clear. 
6. It might be suggested that we should interpret the Bible as Jesus or Paul or other New Testament 
writers interpreted their Scriptures. For the sake of argument, let us grant that this principle is 
properly derivable from Christian beliefs. It surely is not sufficient to give us a technique of biblical 
interpretation. For we must determine how Paul and the other New Testament writers interpreted 
their Scriptures. What method shall we use in doing this? We cannot yet use Paul's and the other 
New Testament writers', for we have not yet identified that method. (And what shall we do if we 
find that they used different, or even conflicting, methods? Perhaps that issue will not arise, but can 
we be sure it will not?) Similarly for Jesus' method, we need a method of interpreting the Gospels 
and assessing their historical reliability in order to identify his method. 
7. The literature on these matters is vast, but a good survey of the developments in Old Testament 
criticism may be found in Herbert Hahn, The Old Testament in Modern Research (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1954), and of developments in New Testament criticism in Werner Georg Kummel, 
The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of Its Problems, tr. S. Mclean Gilmour and 
Howard C. Kee (Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1972). 
8. I am referring to Christians who believe that the Bible is "inerrant" (their term). Cf., e.g., 
Norman L. Geisler (ed.), Inerrancy (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1980) and 
James Montgomery Boice (ed.), The Foundation of Biblical Authority (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan 
Publishing House, 1978). According to this view, one must regard the Bible as free from all factual 
errors of any type (scientific and historical, as well as doctrinal). Any approach to the Bible which 
does not make this assumption or which yields a result indicating some factual error in the Bible 
must be rejected. (See especially J. Barton Payne, "Higher Criticism and Biblical Inerrancy," pp. 
83-113 in the Geisler volume.) Since advocates of this view also generally believe that certain 
traditional doctrines are clearly taught in the Bible, they cannot admit that any doctrines inconsistent 
with them are also taught in the Bible, for that admission would indicate that the Bible is not inerrant 
(since two inconsistent doctrines cannot both be true). Therefore, adherents of this view do not have 
in their other Christian beliefs any resources which might lead them to significantly new understandings 
of their Christian faith. (Useful discussions of this view may be found in David Kelsey, The Uses 
of Scripture in Recent Theology [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975], pp. 17-24 and Stephen T. 
Davis, The Debate about the Bible [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977], pp. 23-48.) 
9. Admittedly, beliefs about the proper techniques for historical or literary analysis are not easy 
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to justify. Such techniques are accepted because they seem to enable us to understand a wide range 
of historical events or literary texts. That is, they are substantiated by fruitfulness in widespread 
use. But such fruitfulness is not easy to demonstrate directly. That a technique has passed the test 
of fruitfulness in use can properly be determined only by someone with a detailed knowledge of the 
results it gives. Generally only specialists in that area will have that knowledge, and the rest of us 
will have to rely on their judgment. Thus, for nonspecialists the best evidence of the appropriateness 
of a technique is its widespread acceptance by experts. This is, of course, not an infallible indicator 
that a certain technique gives reliable results, but it is the best we have. Because it is not an infallible 
indicator, very conservative Christians can claim that they are not being irrational in rejecting 
techniques which yield results at variance with their beliefs, for they have a right to their pre-phil-
osophical convictions. But again I ask, if they were wrong, how could they ever find out? 
10. Those branches of the Christian tradition with an authoritative teaching office-most notably 
the Roman Catholic-have a somewhat less acute problem than do those branches which lack it. 
But even within Roman Catholicism there are disputes about the significance of authoritative teachings 
and how to interpret them. Do these teachings, for example, positively state what is true or merely 
authoritatively delimit what is false? And whichever view one takes, how shall one understand the 
meaning of what was said in the past? In principle, one might always seek a contemporary clarification 
from the teaching authority; but a local bishop's pronouncement is not infallible, and the pope rarely 
makes ex cathedra pronouncements. So even in traditions with a teaching office, the use of modem 
beliefs and techniques seems difficult to avoid. 
II. John Hick (ed.) (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977). 
12. Accounts of the Marburg Colloquy can be found in Hans J. Hillerbrand, The Reformation: A 
Narrative History Related by Contemporary Observers and Participants (New York: Harper & Row, 
1964), pp. 155-62, and in Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church, rev. ed. (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), p. 333. Hillerbrand (p. 157) quotes Oecolampadius, a Reformed 
thinker, as saying, "Christ is risen and sitting at the right hand of the Father; consequently he is not 
in the bread." 
It is interesting to note that the Lutherans had a (philosophicaJ!) reply which they might have 
used: it is inappropriate to take the quote as referring to Jesus' literal body, for God does not have 
a body and thus does not have a literal right hand. But the Reformed thinkers might have pushed 
their philosophical objection by pointing out that according to the New Testament accounts, when 
Jesus spoke the words of institution before his death, his body was (presumably) a normal physical 
body. How then could Jesus have been physically present in his normal human body and also 
physically present in the elements? 
13. As I pointed out earlier, however, many non-Christian philosophers do not try to justify their 
metaphysical schemes, and none have succeeded in justifying them to the satisfaction of the general 
philosophical community. Thus, the conviction that a Christian philosopher should not be required 
to justify his Christian framework before using it accords with the typical practice of the philosophical 
community in relation to metaphysical schemes. 
14. Perhaps because Plantinga views Christian beliefs as pre-philosophical (268), he docs not confront 
this indebtedness of many Christian beliefs to what were once secular beliefs and concepts. In the 
life of an individual, most Christian beliefs are (in most cases anyway, but perhaps not for many 
Christian philosophers) pre-philosophical beliefs. But in the Christian tradition, they are not pre-phil-
osophical, for they were formed through contact over centuries with various philosophies. And the 
Christian individual gets his "pre-philosophical" beliefs from the Christian tradition, in which he 
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participates. So even if a Christian has, as Plantinga claims, "as much right to his pre-philosophical 
opinions as others have to theirs," a Christian may well wonder if he should rest content in these 
beliefs, given their ancestry. Moreover, even if the beliefs were not influenced by various philosophies, 
not all pre-philosophical beliefs have equally good genealogies. So is it wise for the Christian 
philosopher to take these beliefs as touchstones for evaluating secular beliefs, even if he is within 
his intellectual rights to do so? I think not. (I am indebted to Lad Sessions for some of the ideas in 
this note.) 
15. I say "at least" because maybe the appeal should also be explicitly to truly Christian beliefs 
which are also true. But perhaps in this context we would just assume that any truly Christian belief 
would also be true. 
16. I am indebted to several people for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper: Prof. 
David Basinger of Roberts Wesleyan College, Prof. Richard Creel of Ithaca College, Prof. Lad 
Sessions of Washington & Lee University, and Prof. Linda Zagzebski of Loyola Marymount Univer-
sity. 
